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This article empirically examines one of the most important causes of the
non-implementation of human rights-based approaches to development
(HRBAD): their alleged limited relevance for actors on the ground. The
article argues that claims about local relevance can only be made after
meaningful consultation with local rights-holders. Consulting local
rights-holders in order to ensure responsive planning is not only
relevant for HRBADs, but for development interventions more generally.
The article presents new material on the Sanitized Villages programme
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to assess whether and how
rights-holders are consulted, and identiﬁes four mechanisms that can
facilitate meaningful consultation.
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Cet article examine de manière empirique l’une des causes les plus
importantes de la non-mise en œuvre des approches du développement
basées sur les droits de l’homme (ADBDH) : sa pertinence présumée
limitée pour les acteurs sur le terrain. L’article soutient que les
afﬁrmations relatives à la pertinence au niveau local ne peuvent être
faites qu’après une consultation véritable des détenteurs de droits. La
consultation des détenteurs de droits locaux aﬁn de veiller à une
planiﬁcation réactive est pertinente non seulement pour les ADBDH,
mais aussi pour les interventions de développement de manière plus
générale. Cet article présente de nouveaux supports relatifs au
programme Sanitized Villages (villages assainis) mené en République
démocratique du Congo pour évaluer si et comment les détenteurs de
droits sont consultés, et identiﬁe quatre mécanismes qui peuvent
faciliter une consultation véritable.
El presente artículo examina empíricamente una de las causas más
importantes para no implementar enfoques basados en los derechos
humanos para el desarrollo (HRBAD por sus siglas en inglés): su supuesta
pertinencia limitada en el caso de los actores en el terreno. La autora
sostiene que las aﬁrmaciones relativas a la pertinencia local solo pueden
formularse tras una cuidadosa consulta realizada a los derechohabientes
locales. En aras de asegurar la implementación de la planeación ﬂexible,
la consulta a esta población reviste importancia para los HRBAD y para
otras intervenciones de desarrollo en general. Al respecto, el artículo da
cuenta de nueva información surgida del programa de Aldeas
Higienizadas implementado en la República Democrática del Congo, que
puede ser utilizada para valorar si los derechohabientes son consultados
y de qué forma lo son, identiﬁcando, además, cuatro mecanismos que
podrían facilitar la realización de una consulta signiﬁcativa.
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Introduction
‘‘Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home; so close and small that they
cannot be seen on any map of the world.’’ Eleanor Roosevelt, “In Our Hands” (1958 speech delivered on the
tenth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights)
Human rights have become the dominant normative conception in the ﬁeld of development in
the last two decades, and have been explicitly incorporated in development programming principles.
The human rights-based approach to development (HRBAD) refers to a conceptual framework for the
process of human development that is “normatively based on international human rights standards
and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights” (OHCHR 2006, 15). In this
article I do not analyse the broad variety of ways in which human rights and development are
linked, but rather the more speciﬁc issue of operationalisation of HRBADs.1
The 2003 UN Common Understanding on the HRBAD (UN 2003) called on all UN programmes to
mainstream the human rights standards contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a
guiding principle, and identiﬁed the operational principles of this approach. These principles include
meaningful participation of rights-holders, integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches, and
local ownership of the development process. While there is no formal obligation to consult rights-
holders in the UN Common Understanding of the HRBAD, the references to participation, inclusion,
and local ownership implicitly invite for the consultation of rights-holders at various stages of the
intervention. There is, moreover, widespread agreement amongst development practitioners and
scholars that the voices of rights-holders should be taken into account when planning interventions
(see, for example, Nyamu-Musembi 2005; Merry 2006; Gready 2008). From a theoretical point of view,
the consultation of rights-holders is a pertinent component of responsive planning.2
In academia, the HRBAD has received signiﬁcant attention because it provides a coherent norma-
tive framework for interventions, which focuses on socially and economically disadvantaged groups
and which has the potential to repoliticise development and to challenge the structures that lead to
inequality (see, for example, Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall 2004; Gready 2008; Gysler 2012; Gready
and Vandenhole 2014).
Despite wide acclaim for the potential of a HRBAD, earlier ﬁeldwork (Russell 2010; Destrooper
2015) showed that many development actors, including those in our case study, are reluctant to
structure interventions along the lines of this paradigm, and instead adopt more hands-on para-
digms, such as Sanitation Marketing (SanMark) or a Community Approach to Total Sanitation
(CATS).3 These alternative paradigms are also promoted by higher decision-making levels (see, for
example, WaSH 2010; UNICEF 2013a, 2013b), meaning that policy ofﬁcers often perceive the
HRBAD as just one among many priorities to mainstream, rather than as an overarching principle
(Uvin 2007; Gysler 2012). Vandenhole and Gready (2014) point out that development practitioners
often see human rights as a framework for structural change rather than as a tool for addressing con-
crete or technical development matters. The assumption of social change that is implicit in a HRBAD
can indeed challenge the practical relevance of the approach. Adopting a HRBAD means talking
about the relationship between a state and its citizens, and transforms a fairly neutral development
discourse into a political process (Uvin 2007; Russell 2010). Development practitioners often argue
that they are not in a position to pressure government because they do not have a mandate to
do so, and because this would challenge their partnership with government.
In addition to these reasons for non-implementation, policy ofﬁcers often assume that a HRBAD
cannot adequately talk to the concrete realities of rights-holders (Destrooper 2015). Whereas the
human rights norms that underlie a HRBAD are universal, development projects, inevitably, are con-
textual and grounded in local realities. This can lead to problems in the process of translating these
universal values and discourses to concrete and contextualised interventions (Gysler 2012). As one of
the interviewees in this study argued:
‘‘ … the HRBAD is a very Western concept. Here people do not really understand the difference between the right
to water and the need for water. At least, you can’t assume they do. Even I ﬁnd the distinction very abstract and
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difﬁcult, so if you are working with people who have no formal education whatsoever and who live in a country
that doesn’t really have laws the way we know it, it’s really difﬁcult for them to understand what this means.’’
This interpretation risks equating a rights-based approach with a needs-based approach. The latter
was pursued by most UN development agencies before 1997 and consisted of identifying the basic
needs of beneﬁciaries and either supporting initiatives to improve service delivery or advocating for
the fulﬁlment of these needs. This approach, in theory, stands in stark contrast with the rights-based
approach in the sense that an unfulﬁlled need merely leads to dissatisfaction, whereas an unfulﬁlled
right constitutes a violation and empowers the rights-holder to seek – legal – redress or reparation.
This means that a rights-based approach also brings duty-bearers and their responsibility into the
picture, and endeavours to create a dynamic of accountability, which is not the case under a
needs-based approach. Earlier research on the Sanitized Villages programme however showed
that there is virtually no attention for the responsibility of duty-bearers, the accountability of devel-
opment actors, the empowerment of rights-holders to claim their rights, or the potential of a HRBAD
to politicise development (Destrooper 2015).
The statement of the UNICEF country ofﬁcer above, moreover, does not only equate a HRBAD with
a needs-based approach, it also suggests that the decision to omit certain elements of a HRBAD –
such as references to duty-bearers, accountability, and claiming rights – is a matter of responsive
planning, because rights-holders expressed no interest in these elements. In this article, I assess
whether the decision to implement a scaled-down version of the HRBAD in this case can indeed
be interpreted as responsive planning. To do so, I assess whether rights-holders have at all been con-
sulted about their priorities and preferences, and whether the decision to scale down the HRBAD was,
as some country ofﬁcers suggested, based on consultations with local rights-holders. Based on this
analysis, I identify four mechanisms that affect the potential to consult rights-holders and to
develop a bi-directional, top-down bottom-up, programme.
Theoretical perspective
This article’s concern with local voices is rooted in the very conceptualisation of the HRBAD as a top-
down bottom-up approach (UN 2003). The theoretical perspective that captures this bi-directionality
is De Feyter’s concept of the localisation of human rights (De Feyter, 2006; De Feyter et al. 2011). This
perspective conceptualises the bi-directionality inherent in the use and development of human rights
norms, and theorises the ways in which human rights norms and development programmes that
originate at the transnational level can be translated to the local context, as well as the question
of how local voices can be upstreamed to render global human rights and development architecture
more reﬂective of rights-holders’ concerns (De Feyter 2006; Oré Aguilar 2011).
This perspective builds on two other actor-centred approaches to human rights. First, the ground-
breaking work by Merry on vernacularisation, who argues that for existing human rights norms to
become effective, these need to be situated within local contexts of power and meaning by
norm-entrepreneurs and implemented on the basis of a vernacularised consensus (see, for
example, Merry 2006; Levitt and Merry 2009). Second, the literature on the upstreaming of local
human rights concerns, which focuses on the potential of local rights-holders to shape the inter-
national human rights architecture (see, for example, De Gaay Fortman 2011). It is precisely De
Feyter’s proposal to integrate these top-down and bottom-up processes that makes his framework
relevant for this article. I use this perspective to explore how the HRBAD can be made relevant for
the most disempowered and vulnerable groups.
Case study and ﬁeldwork
This article uses new empirical material on the Sanitized Villages programme in the Kongo Central
province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to examine whether and how this programme,
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which is formally human rights-based, seeks to engage with voices from below in different stages of
the intervention, and whether the input from these consultations was upstreamed and integrated.
The Sanitized Villages programme seeks to implement small cost-efﬁcient changes to improve
people’s access to clean water and to improve sanitation facilities in rural areas. The programme is
ofﬁcially administered by the DRC government. However, in practice, UNICEF plays a dominant
role in the decision-making because of its ﬁnancial and organisational importance.4 UNICEF formally
adheres to a HRBAD and is supposed to use this as a criterion for selecting its partners, according to
Executive Directive 98-04 (also see UNICEF 2012). One could therefore expect to ﬁnd a HRBAD in this
programme.5
The article is based on ﬁeldwork in Kongo Central carried out in spring 2012 and on ongoing
anthropological ﬁeldwork. Together with a junior researcher and an interpreter, I carried out semi-
structured qualitative interviews with village elders (n = 9), rights-holders (n = 16), organisers (n =
3), and local health ofﬁcers in charge of implementing the programme (n = 9). These interviews
probed for the role which the HRBAD played in planning interventions on the ground. They also
gauged gauging how this approach was perceived by rights-holders and implementers. In addition,
we carried out observations and organised focus groups in nine villages participating in the Sanitized
Villages programme. On the basis of these initial visits, further anthropological ﬁeldwork is being
carried out in the coastal district of Kongo Central. Several interviews were also held with experts
in Kinshasa and Matadi, the provincial capital. These interviews focused on the strategies and organ-
isational dynamics shaping the interventions. For this article, we interviewed all present members
(n = 10) of UNICEF’s Division for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH). This included the programme
director, as well as ofﬁcers in charge of sub-domains such as communication, institutional support,
training and development, monitoring and evaluation, partnerships, and emergency interventions.
Mid-ranking government ofﬁcials of the Ministry of Health who were involved in this programme
(n = 3) and the programme ofﬁcer of a project partner (SNV) were also interviewed. Interviews
with rights-holders were carried out in Kikongo (with the assistance of an interpreter) or French.
Expert interviews were carried out in French or English. Names of interviewees and villages are
not disclosed, in order to protect the identity of participants in this research.
The next section visibilises the concrete experiences of rights-holders, which are often invisible in
ofﬁcial reports. I do not assume these narratives to hold a stronger claim to truth than the narrative in
ofﬁcial programme documents, and present them as a complement to the policy documents’ narra-
tive.6 I use the case of one Sanitized Village, which can be considered representative of other villages
in our study. The dynamics that are described here are indicative of more structural processes that
were encountered in all villages to some extent. Following this discussion, I present the situation
in another village that can be considered an outlier case to identify mechanisms that can foster
bi-directionality in the HRBAD. On the basis of this, I reﬂect on structural provisions that can facilitate
the consultation of local actors and the bi-directionality of development interventions.
Navigating between ventriloquism and consultation
The ﬁrst village which we visited was presented to us as a success story by the Local Health Ofﬁcer in
charge of the programme. Upon arrival, we were welcomed by villagers and were shown the sanitary
infrastructure, that appeared to be in good shape. During the focus group discussion with members
of the village committee, respondents initially expressed their satisfaction with how the project had
been implemented and with its outcomes. Several villagers concurred that there had been training
sessions and consultations before the start of the intervention, and that they had a chance to express
their priorities and desires on that occasion. Several respondents also pointed out, in response to our
expressed interest in the issue of human rights, that there had been much attention for the issue of
rights during these sessions. When my colleague followed the Local Health Ofﬁcer to visit an installa-
tion, I continued the group discussion, trying to better understand the nature and scope of the par-
ticipation and consultation the group had mentioned. At this point, it became clear that the situation
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in this village was not the success story our respondents told when the Local Health Ofﬁcer was
within hearing distance.
Whereas people had ﬁrst indicated that the project had been a participative undertaking in which
the entire village joined forces, people were considerably more critical about the nature of this partici-
pation when they felt they could talk freely. On paper, the entire structure of the Sanitized Villages pro-
gramme is based on community participation in each step of the programme: communities request to
join, select a village committee to ensure local ownership, carry out a situation analysis, develop an
action plan, and execute and evaluate that plan (MinSan MinEdu 2011). Yet, in this village, respondents
indicate that they never took a decision as a community to join the programme because the Local
Health Ofﬁce signed them up, that they did not develop the intervention plan themselves, that
there was never a formal evaluation as far as they knew, and that their only participation consisted
of providing manual labour and local material during the execution of the project, which they did
not experience as empowering. There was no participation in the strategic decision-making.
The consultation of rights-holders was restricted to a limited number of practical issues, even though
consultation of rights-holders is explicitly foreseen in the Sanitized Villages programme (MinSan
MinEdu 2011), and even though several WaSH ofﬁcers suggested that some elements of the HRBAD
were not implemented in this case because rights-holders expressed no interest in them.7 Initially, vil-
lagers indicated that they had been consulted on several occasions; however, these consultations were
not frequent and only dealt with practical matters. Respondents moreover indicated that their input
was often ignored.8 Considering that there were never consultations on strategic matters, UNICEF’s
claim that rights-holders did not express an interest in the HRBAD is hard to sustain.
So, rights-holders participate in, and are consulted about, certain practical aspects of the interven-
tions of a programme that is otherwise passed on to them in a top-down manner, but there is no
platform or phase where they can comment on the overall nature of the interventions or where
there is a discussion of more general strategic matters, like the right to water.
When probing what the group referred to when they initially mentioned that the meaning of the
right to water had been explained to them, and whether they did not consider that as a discussion on
strategic interests, one woman interjected:
‘‘ … they told us once that the fact that water is a right, means that water is life, we need water and therefore we
have a responsibility for providing it, and they asked us if we understood this… That’s what you mean with
informing us about our rights, no?’’
The rest of the focus group nodded receptively. “L’eau, c’est la vie [water is life]’’, the slogan of the
national water authority, was used repeatedly from then on, when we asked whether anyone had
talked with them about the fact that access to clean drinking water was a right. No one was familiar
with the idea of duty-bearers or of claiming a right. The interjection of this woman is moreover indica-
tive of the extent to which the discourse of needs and that of rights are used interchangeably in this
programme, thus undermining the speciﬁcity of a HRBAD, which lies precisely in the fact that water
should not merely be treated as a human need, but also as a human right, which can be claimed from
duty-bearers.
The programme structure foresees no explicit phase in which these matters are discussed with
rights-holders, nor are there any provisions for rights-holders to have their voices heard on more
structural matters. When discussing this with the Local Health Ofﬁcer, he hinted at the impossibility
of implementing this:
‘‘You have to look at these people, their level of education, what they need. They need pumps. They need clean
water. They need toilets. I don’t need to ask them. I know. I am a doctor. I know that village and its needs…
Besides, no one is interested in [talking about rights]. [… ] What I am asked is howmany pumps we have installed.
So that’s what we do, we install as many pumps as possible… In the end, it’s only the pumps that matter.’’
This statement is entirely devoid of references to duty-bearers, to claiming rights, or to the participation
of rights-holders in all phases of the programme. All of these are however crucial elements of a HRBAD.
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The interviewee furthermore stated that there was no provision to consult rights-holders about their
strategic interests or their development priorities regarding the right to water, arguing that people
in this situation are not capable of reﬂecting on these abstract issues. UNICEF country ofﬁcers
seemed to share this interpretation and did not push local health ofﬁcers to include this kind of con-
sultation, or to facilitate rights-holders’ participation in structural decision-making.9 The argument that
local rights-holders do not spontaneously bring up their strategic interests, or do not talk about water as
a right, should not be taken at face value as a lack of interest for a framing that politicises the issue of
access to water and that would allow people to take strategic action. It is true that many interviewees in
the villages initially had a blind-spot for more structural issues related to the provision of clean drinking
water or adequate sanitary infrastructure. However, our ﬁeldwork also showed that people were inter-
ested in discussing these issues once they were invited to do so. The decision not to engage with these
rights-holders onmore structural matters can therefore be seen as a tautological reasoning, and ignores
the role programmes like these can play in raising awareness about human rights and about how they
can be applied in speciﬁc localities.
The fact that this is not happening also means that there is only limited attention to the issue of
accountability, another core component of the HRBAD. As the example of the well showed, rights-
holders’ voices are not always adequately integrated in the programme design and execution, and
rights-holders indicated that they had nowhere to go to complain about this. In other villages, inter-
viewees also referred to cases in which their advice had been ignored by the programme coordina-
tors, and to their inability to bring this to anyone’s attention. In some villages people mentioned
instances of fraud, which went unreported because they had nowhere to go to report this. This
hints at a problem with the ﬂow of information, which can be attributed to the lack of sound mech-
anisms for information sharing. Most rights-holders expressed feeling resigned and powerlessness
when discussing how nothing had happened with their suggestions. This points to a structural
failure of the programme, whereby there is no obligation for partners to follow-up on, or react to,
complaints and claims of rights-holders. The blind spot for the consultation of rights-holders on stra-
tegic matters thus also led to a blind spot for the development of mechanisms for sharing infor-
mation more generally. As a senior Country Ofﬁcer mentioned:
‘‘If there is a problem, of fraud or whatever, of course we don’t meddle in that. The goal is precisely to have gov-
ernment take up its own responsibility, without us constantly interfering.’’
This statement is indicative of unwillingness on the part of UNICEF to install sounder mechanisms for
sharing information that could foster accountability and local ownership, while also ensuring that
programmatic information could travel through the system. The absence of such mechanisms inter-
feres with the alleged top-down bottom-up nature of a HRBAD. There are no avenues for local rights-
holders to have their voices heard, nor are there sufﬁcient avenues to ensure that content that is pro-
duced by the development actor is adequately implemented on the ground.
Local relevance then, in the minds of most interviewees at UNICEF’s DRC WaSH ofﬁce, seemed to
refer mainly to the views of local health ofﬁcers, who were not pushed to consult local rights-holders
to gain a better understanding of concerns or to facilitate participation that could lead to a reformu-
lation of the programme. Interviews with UNICEF’s country ofﬁcers conﬁrmed that there had been no
intention to consult rights-holders on these issues, and that the only form of consultation that was
implicit in the programme dealt with practical matters. In practice however, even these consultations
were exiguous, despite their status of a cornerstone of the interventions, and there were no mech-
anisms to ensure the follow-through of rights-holders’ input. Training and interventions were more-
over not structured around a human rights discourse and facilitators did not seek to listen to local
voices. The assumption that local rights-holders do not ﬁnd a HRBAD relevant is not based on the
voices of these rights-holders but rather on local health ofﬁcers’ and country ofﬁcers’ own impression
of the situation. In fact, it would be difﬁcult for local rights-holders to form an opinion about rights-
based interventions at all, since a genuine HRBAD was never implemented.
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This logic was visible in all villages in our study. In other villages too, there had been no discussion
on the right to water and sanitation, no involvement of villagers as rights-holders, and no consul-
tation on substantive issues. Rights-holders were not asked to provide input on their priorities regard-
ing the right to water and sanitation, nor about how they envisioned this change, or what type of
skills they would need for their own clean water supply.
Identifying the mechanisms for bi-directionality in rights-based development
interventions
The lack of formal mechanisms for ensuring bi-directionality is ascribed by UNICEF to the technical
nature of its programme, which renders discussions and interventions based on human rights mark-
edly difﬁcult. Bi-directionality would mean that a HRBAD – as formulated at the level of UNICEF head-
quarters – is implemented in a consistent manner, and that, at the same time, local voices are
upstreamed. This section focuses speciﬁcally on the process of including and upstreaming local
voices, because this has proven to be particularly challenging in practice. I present the case of a
second Sanitized Village that offers several insights as to how consultation on strategic matters
can be facilitated in concrete development interventions, and how this consultation can be concep-
tualised as a ﬁrst step in the upstreaming process.
In this village, like in many others, the quality of hygienic installations had deteriorated rapidly
after the completion of the intervention because people did not feel ownership. Because of how
widespread this problem was, UNICEF’s WaSH Country Ofﬁce ordered an assessment of different
aspects of the programme in 2013. The Dutch Technical Cooperation (Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwil-
ligers, SNV) was one of the partners involved in this assessment, and carried out a pilot project on the
issue of ownership in this speciﬁc village.
During the SNV’s ﬁrst visit to this village, people were sitting outdoors in a circle made of plastic
chairs, and the SNV facilitator sat with them in the circle – unlike most local health ofﬁcers whom we
had seen addressing the group as a teacher. The facilitator talked with people, rather than to people,
and overall villagers were doing most of the talking. When discussing this with the interviewee, the
facilitator referred to a background and training in social work, and to the importance of always trying
to keep discussions as informal as possible and of not acting as an omniscient teacher. The formal
goal of the visit was to assess how local ownership of the sanitation infrastructure could be improved.
Formally, there was no goal of making the process more human rights-based, only a more practical
concern with ensuring that infrastructure worked and would be maintained. Nevertheless, the fact
that rights-holders perceived this as a space to talk freely, encouraged them to also address issues
that went beyond their immediate needs.
This is an important ﬁnding in itself, considering the argument of UNICEF and the Local Health
Ofﬁcers that there was no interest from rights-holders to look beyond their immediate needs. If
this group only cared about their immediate practical needs, the discussion would have been domi-
nated by the lack of resources that interfered with their capacity to maintain the infrastructure and
take ownership. However, while acknowledging the importance of this problem, the group also spon-
taneously referred to the responsibility of others – both the state and UNICEF – to foresee these
resources. Rights-holders further insisted that they should be able to communicate with these
duty-bearers, but that, in order to make their case, they needed both access to relevant partners
and skills to develop a good argument.10 These people insisted that they wanted to learn to write
formal letters, and to formulate convincing arguments in order to be able to negotiate and make
their case for material support. This kind of participation in the process is currently not in place.
People asked to participate in their own interest representation, and not merely in the practical
execution of projects. More speciﬁcally, they see these practical interventions as occasions for
raising awareness and where they could acquire strategic skills that would help them to take
action. In the absence of these skills, rights-holders felt entirely dependent on other actors. As one
woman argued, this dependency leaves the project and the rights-holders more vulnerable
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because there is no way for rights-holders to take action, to demand resources, or even to receive
protection against abuse of power by the Local Health Ofﬁce. Thus, rights-holders themselves ident-
iﬁed a lack of relevant skills and a lack of access to decision-makers, rather than a lack of resources, as
the fundamental causes of a lagging ownership.
This consultation shows that people desired to look beyond their immediate and practical needs,
and that they valued meaningful participation, in order to work for structural change themselves and
to take ownership. Installing this type of meaningful participation of rights-holders is not just a matter
of ensuring the implementation of paradigms that are developed at the transnational level. Because
this type of participation seeks to support rights-holders in amplifying their own voice, it can also be a
way for practitioners to obtain information about the priorities of actors on the ground, and thus, of
facilitating bi-directionality.
Rights-holders’ interest in this kind of participation became clear through an open-ended consul-
tation, and would not have surfaced so explicitly if it were not for the SNV intervention. Because of
the importance of obtaining this kind of information on the priorities of rights-holders, I explore
below the factors that can facilitate this type of open-ended consultation. When comparing the SNV
intervention with those in standard Sanitized Villages, four differences stand out. Three are related to
the question of how to solicit relevant information, the fourth to how to upstream this content.
First, the interpersonal skills of the SNV facilitator played a crucial role. While this ofﬁcer did not
receive speciﬁc training on the job regarding the facilitation of open-ended consultations, he
referred to a background and training in social work to explain why it is easier for some people
to facilitate this kind of intervention that genuinely listens to rights-holders and that seeks to
implement the kind of participatory structures that can foster both awareness-raising on the
side of rights-holders and a better understanding of local needs on the side of implementers. All
local health ofﬁcers and their assistants that were interviewed were originally from the region,
but received no training on how to organise this type of intervention. As doctors, many of these
local health ofﬁcers moreover had the kind of social status that did not easily accommodate a con-
sultation ‘between equals’. This suggests that interpersonal skills are more relevant in this context
than familiarity with the local context. Intervening in a non-authoritative manner to enable people
to share their views and experiences is a skill that often receives too little emphasis in development
programmes. In the case of the UNICEF country ofﬁcers, interviewees indicated that they had not
received this type of training, and that this was not explicitly foreseen for implementing partners
neither.11
Second, the consultation of rights-holders, which is a crucial element to ensure responsive plan-
ning, is often not included in terms of resources in any phase of the intervention. As the SNV ofﬁcer
argued, this case was different, in the sense that the SNV intervention was seen as a last resort:
‘‘You see, the thing is that, they [UNICEF] really didn’t know what to do to improve the situation. There had been
studies of various kinds, including an anthropological study, which was very insightful, but our task was really to
talk to these people and see how we could get them on board, to ﬁnd out what they wanted.’’
This suggests that there was no expected immediate material deliverable in this case, and that
there was room to engage in discussions on structural, cultural, and material elements that kept
people from taking local ownership. Planning the resources and time for this in the programming
phase thus seems crucial. However, neither adequate skills training nor time and resources for con-
sultation are prioritised in practice due to the existence of competing paradigms – such as results-
based management – that do not prioritise the consultation or participation of rights-holders. Prac-
titioners often experience great difﬁculty when seeking to organise consultations, as these cannot
easily be measured or quantiﬁed. This problem is most visible in the fact that country ofﬁcers are
not required by headquarters to report speciﬁcally on the HRBAD in their annual reports, which
address measurable outcomes rather than processes (Destrooper 2015).
This is related to a third factor which can foster the process of listening to local voices, which is the
format and timing of consultations. Considering that the UN Common Understanding of a HRBAD
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(UN 2003) stresses local ownership and top-down bottom-up processes, and that the speciﬁc pro-
gramme structure of the Sanitized Village is explicitly based on the participation and consultation
of local rights-holders, consultation should be mainstreamed throughout every step of the interven-
tion. Consulting rights-holders as an add-on at the start of the programme (when they do not yet
have much information) or only after the interventions (when their advice can no longer have
immediate effect), is insufﬁcient in this context. However, a more permanent form of consultation
is organisationally and logistically complex to implement. Alternative avenues to mainstream consul-
tation should therefore be developed. The intervention of the SNV suggested that meaningful par-
ticipation in every step of the programme can also be used as a means for consulting rights-
holders. Through meaningful and free participation in each step of the programme, rights-holders
feel more empowered and learn to express their preferences about practical matters, which can
also lead to their involvement on work for strategic interests (see, for example, Franceschet 2004).
While it is true that the organisation of formal consultations might not be directly relevant for tech-
nical interventions, these interventions have a focus on participation in any case, and by revisiting the
ways in which participation is organised, more attention for the priorities and frameworks of local
rights-holders is possible. This in turn can foster local ownership and bi-directionality. To facilitate
this, deliverables should be formulated in terms of process, rather than outcome, which requires a
rethinking of the principles of results-based management. The pilot case of the SNV shows that if
these three factors are in place, it is possible to generate relevant content that constitutes interesting
input for development actors at other levels.
There is however a fourth element that needs to be in place to ensure that input that is generated
during these consultations can impact on future programming, namely the existence of adequate
mechanisms for information sharing. With regards to this, the SNV intervention is compelling. No ade-
quate communications existed in the other Sanitized Villages, yet in the case of the SNV intervention,
the SNV, upon the request of villagers, had organised a meeting between committee presidents of
several villages, local health ofﬁcers and their assistants, and local government ofﬁcials to give
rights-holders an opportunity to express their concerns and to foster accountability. Interestingly,
UNICEF country ofﬁcers did not attend this meeting. So even in the most progressive case, there
were no structures for rights-holders to have their voices heard by UNICEF. In this sense, the current
architecture of the programme not only ignores local voices, but structurally excludes them. As one
senior UNICEF interviewee replied when asked about the systematic upstreaming of local concerns,
“We don’t have the intention to talk to the villagers, of course we do not foresee mechanisms for this.
We are only here to support government.”12 The idea was that UNICEF was only a technical supporter
of government and did not want to or need to be involved in the consultation of rights-holders.
Little adaptation to local sensitivities can be expected in the absence of such mechanisms.
The ﬁeldwork thus showed that the SNV was capable of consulting local rights-holders in an open-
ended manner – in the framework of practical interventions – because the personal skills, time and
resources, and structural mechanisms for consultation through participation were all in place. The ﬁeld-
work also suggests that this contextualisation of the rights discourse can happen in the framework of
practical interventions. With regards to upstreaming however, problems persisted, because of the
absence of mechanisms for systematically upstreaming input from below, and because there is no obli-
gation for UNICEF – or other partners – to react to claims of rights-holders. Several UNICEF country ofﬁ-
cers and local health ofﬁcers argued that it was not necessary to install such mechanisms, or even to
organise consultations, because no substantial input on strategic issues could be expected from rights-
holders with overall low levels of formal education, and because local health ofﬁcers allegedly knew
local sensitivities.13 The SNV case showed however that rights-holders are capable of, and interested
in, a nuanced situation analysis and solutions that are relevant for them. These rights-holders’ focus
on duty-bearers, access, and making demands, can moreover be read in light of the HRBAD’s
promise to address structural causes of rights violations. This suggests that the HRBAD might have
more local resonance than UNICEF ofﬁcers claimed, and that implementing a HRBAD in a systematic
manner could give people additional leverage and imbue their claims with more legitimacy.
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Discussion and conclusion
There is a growing consensus in literature and amongst practitioners that engaging with local duty-
bearers is a necessary ﬁrst step towards beneﬁcial and lasting social change (De Feyter 2006; Merry
2006; OHCHR 2006). Our ﬁeldwork showed that this is not systematically taking place in this case. The
decision of UNICEF to omit certain elements of a HRBAD – such as references to rights-holders,
accountability, bi-directionality – was allegedly based on the preferences of rights-holders and the
non-relevance of these elements in the local context. This article showed that the assessment of
local relevance and the subsequent decision to implement this scaled-down version of the HRBAD
was based on a top-down assessment of the situation rather than on rights-holders’ own assessment.
Moreover, this scaled-down HRBAD did not increase the local relevance of the programme. The
Sanitized Villages programme is indeed perceived by many rights-holders as heteronomous.
However, this seems to be due to the lack of bi-directionality, rather than to the HRBAD as such –
a genuine HRBAD has never really been implemented because of operational challenges. The
decision to label the programme as a HRBAD, but to structure actual interventions around alternative
paradigms such as CATS or SanMark, seems ineffective. There is no indication that these paradigms
will be more locally relevant since they too are developed top-down, and since there are no mech-
anisms to foster bi-directionality or localization in these paradigms neither.14 Moreover, equating a
HRBAD with a market-based or community-based approach hollows out the meaning of the
HRBAD, as well as the very meaning of human rights (Russell 2010).
The intervention of the SNV showed that service delivery and the empowerment of rights-holders
are not irreconcilable and that it is possible for development actors to proceed through genuine human
rights-based processes when pursuing practical goals, even when contextual factors are not conducive.
The SNV intervention showed that non-authoritative consultation on strategic concerns is possible if
there is attention for adequate training of facilitators, if there are resources and time for this, and if
this is mainstreamed in all phases of the process by means of meaningful participation that prepares
rights-holders for thinking about their strategic interests. Where these three factors were in place,
rights-holders proposed a genuinely nuanced view regarding the realisation of their right to water
and regarding the strategies needed to achieve this. This information is potentially relevant to upstream
to development practitioners. In speciﬁc, rights-holders requested access to decision-makers and the
kind of skills training that would allow them to make proposals for structural change. They themselves
thus underlined the need for more meaningful participation. The consultation suggested that rights-
holders in fact had several requests that overlap with the logic of a HRBAD, and that, therefore, a
HRBAD should not be considered irrelevant in concrete technical interventions. However, in this
case too, there were problems with the upstreaming and sharing of these concerns, meaning that
the top-down bottom-up synergy proposed by the common understanding remains absent (UN 2003).
If UNICEF seeks to develop its interventions in line with its own organisational guidelines, speciﬁcally
Executive Directive 98-04, and article 45 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, there should be
genuine efforts to implement a HRBAD in a way which is relevant for rights-holders, and there should
be more attention to amplifying the voices of rights-holders in all phases of the programme, in particu-
lar at key moments when rights-holders’ strategic interests are at stake.15 For this to happen, four
elements that are currently not systematically prioritised should be mainstreamed. While UNICEF is a
decentralised structure, an important share of the responsibility for facilitating this also lies with head-
quarters, which can demand accountability for these elements from its country ofﬁces in the annual
reports, and which should foresee adequate resources for this. In the absence of efforts to work on
these four domains, local voices risk being further excluded systematically.
Notes
1. For a general overview, see Andreassen and Crawford (2013); Gready and Vandenhole (2014); Gready and Ensor
(2005); Hickey and Mitlin (2009); and Gauri and Gloppen (2012).
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2. Although participation in the Common Understanding refers to the broadest possible process of including rights-
holders, there are several ways in which participation can be conceptualised and implemented to facilitate consultation.
While both participation and consultation of local rights-holders are pinned on the assumption that the input of these
rights-holders is valuable, neither is empowering in itself, and there is no simple causal relation between both terms.
3. SanMark approaches see water and sanitation as commodities in a market and limit the role of development actors
to facilitating the free ﬂow of goods in the market. CATS lay the main responsibility for water and sanitation with the
community, without addressing structural or political inequalities.
4. Government contributes less than 1% of the programme funding. The rest comes from bilateral aid, largely coordi-
nated by UNICEF.
5. UNICEF was one of the ﬁrst UN programmes to formally adopt this approach in 1998, with Executive Directive 98-04.
This sets out how human rights norms will henceforth inspire every intervention. A rhetorical adherence to a HRBA
can be observed at all levels of UNICEF and is more explicitly present in the discourse of UNICEF than in many other
organisations (Russell 2010; Gysler 2012). UNICEF, together with UNDP, was one of the ﬁrst to operationalise HRBA
(Nyamu-Musembi 2004; Russell 2010; Gysler 2012).
6. When we speak of ‘local voices’ or ‘voices from below’, we reject an understanding that places the global above the
local or that sees local constituencies as uniform and static units organised around a shared culture. We argue that
local realities can be a fertile ground for promoting human rights and development, but that it is the interplay
between the transnational process and the practices of local users, which in the end holds the potential of
making universal human rights norms and development programmes relevant for users.
7. The programme documents foresee that the village committee takes the lead in each step of the intervention, which
implies that they should be consulted by the Local Health Ofﬁce and technical assistants, especially in the early phase.
8. One interviewee reported that the village committee had warned the engineers not to construct the well on the
southern side of the village, because of ﬂoods in the rainy season, but that this advice had been ignored,
meaning that the current well is not operational for several months every year.
9. It should also be noted that local health ofﬁcers usually are medical professionals, with little experience in the organ-
ising inclusive consultation processes, and that they are not trained on this in the framework of the Sanitized Villages
programme.
10. The notion of duty-bearers is absent as such, but the meaning of ‘responsible’ overlaps largely with that of duty-
bearers in international law.
11. Previous research also showed that ofﬁcers do not receive speciﬁc training on the implementation of a HRBA or on
human rights issues more generally, and that there are only few hands-on implementation tools regarding these
issues (Russell 2010; Destrooper 2015).
12. While this ofﬁcer was more explicit about this issue than other interviewees, the ofﬁcer seemed to voice what other
interviewees were also hinting at.
13. Note that such upstreaming mechanisms did exist for practical concerns. For example, the U-Report system was an
SMS service installed in the Sanitized Villages, which gave villagers the opportunity to ﬂag problems with sanitation,
like the outbreaks of diseases. These mechanisms could be used as blueprint for mechanisms for upstreaming input
on strategic matters.
14. This article does not argue that HRBADs are more valuable than alternative paradigms such as the CATS as such, but
takes issue with the rhetorical inﬂation of the HRBAD to an extent where it comes to mean very little, and with the
introduction of new paradigms which have also been developed top-down and which are, as such, equally out of
touch with local realities.
15. This is irrespective of the direct human rights obligations which UNICEF is considered to have. See Nyamu-Musembi
(2004) and Uvin (2007).
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